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EMERGENCY TENANT PROTECTION IN
NEW YORK: TEN YEARS OF RENT
STABILIZATION
I. Introduction
The New York City rent stabilization system was established in
1969' as an alternative to placing all housing constructed after 1947
under standard rent control. 2 The stabilization system is unique
because it places the responsibility of regulation in the hands of the
real estate industry3 rather than in governmental hands as have
conventional systems of rent control.4
Under rent stabilization, registered owners of eligible buildings
are entitled to periodic rent increases upon the signing of new
leases.' The increase allowed varies from year to year, according to
the owners' increased operating and maintenance costs. Uniform
increases for the entire housing stock are determined by an impar-
tial rent guidelines board.' As additional incentive to owners, the
stabilization system authorized the real estate industry to draft a
code, based on express provisions in the law detailing the terms and
conditions of the tenants' occupancies. 7
The code is the key to the owners' self-regulatory powers. It is also
the key to tenant protection. The law and code stipulate that the
annually set percentage increase is a maximum.' Furthermore, own-
ers may not decrease services which they are required to provide
their tenants.' The law is designed to be self-implementing so that
when conflicts arise, the parties can resolve their disputes without
administrative intervention.'0 Where intervention is necessary, how-
1. N.Y. CITY RENT STABILIZATION LAW, 1969 N.Y. Local Laws No. 16, NEW YORK, N.Y.
ADM. CODE §§YY51-1.0 to 7.0 in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as RSL].
2. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8601-17 (McKinney 1974). See also N.Y. CITY RENT AND
REHABILITATION LAW, 1962 N.Y. Local Laws No. 20, NEW YORK, N.Y. ADM. CODE §§ Y51-1.0
to -18.0 in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS (McKinney 1975).
3. RSL §YY51-6.0
4. See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8602, 8604 (New York's Rent Control Law which
vested power of regulation in a "city housing rent agency").
5. RSL § YYY51-6.0(c)(2).
6. RSL § YY51-5.0.
7. RSL § YY51-6.0(b)(2).
8. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(1), 6.0(c)(2).
9. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(8).
10. See note 91 infra.
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ever, the parties may appeal to a special quasi-judicial board" cre-
ated to interpret the code, resolve disputes, and oversee the law's
enforcement.
Observers claim it ironic that landlords have been given power to
supervise a system set up to protect tenants, the landlord's tradi-
tional adversary.'" The New York Court of Appeals, however, indi-
cated that industry supervision could benefit the system of adding
valuable knowledge and experience to its administration.'"
Legislative and administrative shortcomings in the stabilization
system have become increasingly significant and troublesome with
the law's extension in time and expanded jurisdiction. Since 1974,
more than half-a-million older housing units have been added to the
stabilization stock. Simple rules have grown technical and complex
and many fail to consider the individual needs of the diverse struc-
tures under its jurisdiction. In addition, owners have become rest-
less with the continued renewal of a law initially deemed temporary.
This Comment surveys the stabilization system's history and cur-
rent status as a viable method of municipal rent regulation. Part II
traces the origins and development of the rent stabilization law in
New York City. Part II1 examines the key problems which have
arisen as a result of the system's expansion under the Emergency
Tenant Protection Act of 1974. And Part IV examines the effect of
long-term extension on a "temporary" solution.
II. Legislative History
A. Background
In 1962, pursuant to enabling legislation enacted by the State,'4
11. RSL § YY51-6.0(b)(2).
12. See, e.g., Comment, The New York Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, 70 COLUM. L. Ra'.
156 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Law of 1969]. The author noted "the inherent weakness of a
scheme in which the interests of those charged with administering a law are opposed to those
of the groups which the law is designed to protect." Id. at 170.
Tenant groups agree, indicating that self-policing by landlords is akin to "having the wolf
guard the sheep." Letter from Jane Benedict, Chairwoman, Metropolitan Council on Hous-
ing, New York City, Nov. 28, 1978.
Some leaders of the real estate industry take issue with the above posture, suggesting that
the modern landlord views his tenants not as adversaries, but as "customers." Interview with
Sheldon Katz, Chairman, Real Estate Industry Association (RSA), in Brooklyn, August 4,
1978.
13. 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 261 N.E.2d 647, 313 N.Y.S.2d 733,
appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 962 (1970).
14. 1962 N.Y. Laws 51, ch. 21.
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the City of New York passed an act which placed more than one
million of its residential housing accommodations under city rent
control.'" This act expressly excluded from its purview certain
classes of housing accommodations including buildings completed
on or after February 1, 1947.'1
Post-1947 housing was left uncontrolled in the hope that supply
and demand would eventually work to make controls unneces-
sary.'7 The legislature believed that the imposition of rent control
on new housing would only prolong the post war housing shortage
problem by discouraging new construction.'
A rush to build apartments in the late 1950s and early 1960s left
New York with surplus housing by the mid-1960s.'5 However, by
1968 deterioration outstripped construction and the city faced an-
other critical housing shortage.' Landlords found they had leverage
to charge and receive from their tenants rent increases of 40% or
more.' By 1969 the vacancy rate had plummetted to an all-time
low. 2 2 Tenant groups began to complain that exorbitant rents were
driving the middle class from the city. 3 Owners responded that they
were entitled to a return on their investments and that supply and
demand determined rents.2
15. N.Y. CITY RENT AND REHABILITATION LAW, 1962 N.Y. Local Laws No. 20, NEW YORK,
N.Y. ADM. CODE .§§ Y51-1.0 to -18.0 in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS (McKinney 1974). Rent control
in New York was an emergency measure caused by critical post war housing shortages. In
1942, the United States Government instituted the first emergency rent controls under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 2, Pub. L. No. 56-421, 56 Stat. 24, repealed
by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 651. In New York, commercial rent
control was enacted in 1945, 1945 N.Y. Laws 779, ch. 315 (codified in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§§ 8521-38 (McKinney 1961)); business rent control also in 1945, 1945 N.Y. Laws 771 ch. 314,
codified in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8551-67 (McKinney 1961); and residential rent control
in 1946, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8581-97 (McKinney 1961).
16. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8582(2)(g). See also N.Y. CITY ADM. CODE § Y51-3.0(2)(h).
17. See 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 136, 261 N.E.2d 647, 653, 313
N.Y.S.2d 733, 742, appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 962 (1970).
18. Id. at 137, 261 N.E.2d at 654, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
19. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1978, §8, at 8, col. 5.
20. Id.
21. See Affidavit of Jason R. Nathan, Administrator of the Housing and Development
Association (HDA), 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 132, 137-38, 261 N.E.2d
647, 651, 654, 313 N.Y.S.2d 733, 739, 742-43.
22. Id.
23. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1978, §8, at 8, col. 5.
24. Id.
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B. The Rent Stabilization Act
On May 6, 1969, in light of what had become a housing emergency
in New York City, the Lindsay administration signed the Rent Sta-
bilization Act of 1969 (RSL) into law. 5 Those buildings. which rent
control had earlier left uncontrolled became subject to the regula-
tions of the RSL. The RSL cited in its legislative findings "exactions
of unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive rents and rental agreements
. . .profiteering, speculation and other disruptive practices"' as
the conditions which made the legislation necessary.
Under the RSL's original five-year plan only those buildings con-
structed between February 1, 1947 and March 10, 1969 containing
six or more individual apartment units" were subject to the law's
jurisdiction.29 However, to become stabilized, owners of eligible
buildings first had to register with the real estate industry associa-
tion, the Rent Stabilization Association, (RSA)3" created by the law.
Voluntary registration and compliance are key features of the
RSL.31 However, an interim rent board set up in early 1969 before
the RSL's enactment, suggested that a purely voluntary association
would not work without some compulsory feature. The board recom-
mended,32 and the law later provided,3 3 that the buildings of land-
lords who refused or failed to register with the RSA be placed under
standard rent control. This alternative was so severe that within six
months after the RSL's enactment, 98 per cent of all eligible owners
25. 1969 N.Y. Local Laws No. 16, NEw YORK, N.Y. ADM. CODE §§ YY51-1.0 to -7.0 in N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAWS (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1978).
26. RSL § YY51-1.0.
27. RSL § YY51-3.0(1).
28. However, apartments in the following buildings may be rent stabilized even if the
building contains fewer than six dwelling units: buildings receiving tax abatement benefits
pursuant to Section 421 of the Real Property Tax Law or Section J51-2.5 of the Administra-
tive Code; buildings under the participation loan program of Article 15 of the Private Housing
Finance Law. N.Y. City Conciliation and Appeals Board, Tenant's and Owner's Rights and
Duties Under The Rent Stabilization Law 7 (1978).
29. RSL § YY51-3.0. The RSL also covered apartments decontrolled under the rent con-
trol law and buildings constructed after March 10, 1969 which received special tax abate-
ments. See note 28 supra. The law did not cover apartments in buildings owned by city, state,
or federal agencies nor apartments in buildings financed by loans from public agencies or
public-benefit corporations. Co-operatives and condominiums are)also not covered. Id.
30. RSL § YY51-6.0.
31. RSL § YY51-6.0(b)(4).
32. See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, 2 PRAcTIcE UNDER THE NEW RENT STABILIZATION LAw 4
(1970).
33. RSL § YY51-4.0(a).
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had reportedly joined the association.3 Registered owners who failed
to comply with the law, by exceeding allowable rent levels or by
harassing tenants in order to obtain vacancies, were subject to a
number of possible sanctions including fines, reductions in rent, or
expulsion from the RSA.35
In addition to the coercive threat of rent control, rent stabilization
created a novel incentive to encourage owner compliance. The rent
stabilization law gave to a private association of stabilized landlords
the authority to draft a code for the regulation of rent increases and
other landlord-tenant related matters specified in the law.3 ' The
code was subject to scrutiny and supervision by the Housing and'
Development Association (HDA) and was based on express provi-
sions found in the 1969 statute.3 1 Still, the approach was unpre-
cedented in the history of rent regulation and gave the landlords a
significant measure of authority. The hope was that self regulation
would not impede and might even encourage new construction,
unlike rent control which, while keeping down rents also destroyed
incentive for properly maintaining building investments.
Rent stabilization entitles owners to periodic rent increases upon
the signing of new leases. 8 The increase permitted varies from year
to year according to the determination of the owners' increased costs
by a rent guidelines board .3 The percentage is added to a "base
date" rent, the rent charged and paid on the date when the tenant's
unit first became stabilized, 0 and sets a ceiling on ordinary in-
creases which an owner may demand from his stabilized tenants.,
34. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1969, at 30, col. 2. However, the report issued by Mayor Lindsay
indicating 98 percent enrollment in the stabilization program should be considered in light
of the fact that it was issued on election night. Law of 1969, supra note 12, at 176 n.132.
35. RSL §§ YY51-6.0(c)(10)-(11).
36. CODE OF THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY STABILIZATION ASSOCIATION OF N.Y. CITY, INC., in
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS (McKinney 1974) [hereinafter cited as RS CODE] (adopted pursuant
to RSL § YY51-6.0).
37. RSL § YY51-6.0.
38. RSL § YY51-5.0(d).
39. RSL §§ YY51-5.0, -6.0(c)(2).
40. R.S. CODE § 2(i).
41. Under the RSL, owners must renew their tenant's leases in accordance with strict time
requirements, and may only refuse renewals upon grounds set out in the code. RS CODE
§§ 60, 54. A five percent additional increase above the prior rent is permitted on vacancy
leases. RSL § YY51-5.0(d). Furthermore, owners may apply to the Conciliation and Appeals
Board (CAB) for increases above the standard guidelines percentage. The code specifically
provides additional increases for comparative hardship, installation of new equipment, and
major capital improvements. RS CODE §§ 43, 20 (c), 41.
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The system of maximum percentage increases was intended to safe-
guard the tenant's right to a reasonable rental while assuring the
landlord an adequate income by which to meet inflation and rising
maintenance costs.
To achieve these objectives, the 1969 statute provided for the
establishment of three administrative boards. These three boards
are the RSA42 (the owner's group), the Rent Guidelines Board"
(which establishes the periodic percentage increases), and the Con-
ciliation and Appeals Board" (which enforces the law by resolving
any landlord-tenant conflicts arising under it). The overall supervi-
sion of the regulatory process is vested in the HDA.45 The HDA is
expressly authorized to enact rules and regulations for the imple-
mentation of the statute," to approve the code of the owner's
group, 7 and to discipline the owners."
1. Rent Stabilization Association (RSA)
The RSA is the private association of landlords empowered under
the 1969 law to draft a code" detailing the terms and conditions of
the tenants' occupancies. The RSA was further empowered to over-
see the registration of all stabilized owners 0 and to collect dues to
finance the law's administration.'
The RSA's rent stabilization code5" is the key to the owners' self-
regulatory powers. Based on express provisions in the law and sub-
42. RSL § YY51-6.0.
43. RSL § YY51-5.0.
44. RSL § YY51-6.0(b)(3).
45. RSL § YY51-4.0(c). HDA's name was changed in early 1978 to the Department of
Housing Preservation and Development. However, for the purposes of this Comment, it will
be referred to throughout as HDA.
46. Id.
47. RSL § YY51-6.0(b)(2).
48. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(11).
49. RSL § YY51-6.0(b)(2).
50. NEW YORK CITY CONCILIATION AND APPEALS BOARD OF THE RENT STABILIZATION LAW, 1977
YEAR END REPORT, at 5 [hereinafter cited as CAB REPORT].
51. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(12); RS Code § 9. Under the RSL, taxpayers are not required to
contribute towards the cost of financing the stabilization program. To raise the nearly three
million dollars needed to administer and enforce the law in 1978, all stabilized owners were
assessed $4.25 for each of their rent stabilized apartments. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1978, § 8, at
1, col. 2.
52. RS CODE, supra note 36. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(1) provides that the code "is designed to
provide safeguards against unreasonably high rent increases and, in general, to protect ten-
ants and the public interest, and not to impose any industry wide schedule of rents or
minimum rentals."
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ject to HDA's approval,53 the code was nevertheless designed hast-
ily54 and contained many ambiguities55 and loopholes."
2. Rent Guidelines Board (RGB)
The second organization created by the stabilization law is the
Rent Guidelines Board (RGB),57 an independent city agency which
annually establishes the maximum levels of fair rent increases an
owner may charge a tenant entering into a vacancy or renewal lease.
The RGB is composed of two tenant representatives, two ,owner
representatives, and five public members, each of whom is required
to have some expertise in either finance, economics or housing." To
maintain impartiality, the nine-member board may not contain
anyone who owns residential property covered by the law, nor may
it include any person who is an officer of a tenant organization
within the city. 9 All of the members are appointed by the Mayor
and one of the public members is designated to serve as chairman.°
To develop guidelines reflecting the costs of the vast majority of
apartments regulated by the law, the RGB studies price and cost
information for pre-and post-war housing, then takes a weighted
average of the two in order to arrive at a uniform percentage increase
for the entire housing stock." The guideline allowances may not be
53. RSL §§ YY51-6.0(b)(2), -6.0(c).
54. See Law of 1969, supra note 12, at 169 n.95. The landlords were given 60 days in which
to draw up a code. RSL § YY51-6.0(a). The first code was submitted to HDA in late June,
1969, and was rejected on July 8. A revised code was then submitted on July 11, the day before
the 60-day deadline. HDA officials worked on the code, further revising it, until 2 a.m. July
12, the date the code was approved. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1969, at 1, cols. 5-6.
55. For example, the New York Supreme Court has stated that "section 2(m) of the Rent
Stabilization Code [the section dealing with base date requirements] is less than a model
of clarity." Two Lincoln Square Assoc. v. N.Y. City Conciliation and Appeals Board,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1978, at 13, col. 2. See text accompanying notes 152-199 infra for a more
detailed analysis of the ambiguities inherent in section 2(m) of the code.
56. For example, section YY51-6.0(c)(10) specifically provided that owners found exceed-
ing the rent levels permitted under the law would no longer be considered members in good
standing of the RSA; i.e., they would become subject to rent control. However, section 7(a)
of the stabilization code provides that owners lose their good standing only upon a showing
that their non-compliance with the legal rent level was "willful." Thus, despite the code's
purpose to "insure that the level of fair rent increases established under this law will not be
subverted and made ineffective," RSL § YY51-6.0, the code contains provisions in which it
departs, sometimes significantly, from the letter of the law.
57. RSL § YY51-5.0(b)(3).
58. RSL § YY51-5.0(a).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. § YY51-5.0(b). See also Explanatory Statement to Rent Guidelines Board (RGB)
1979]
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exceeded and are, therefore, updated once a year to permit the
owner to obtain, through lease renewals, sufficient rental income to
cover projected increases in operating expenses over a one-, two-, or
three-year lease term. 2
3. Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB)
Supervision and enforcement of the law is the responsibility of the
Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB), 3 an independent and
quasi-judicial board which arbitrates and resolves any disputes that
may arise between the owners and tenants of rent stabilized build-
ings. Under the RSL, the CAB is to receive and act upon written
complaints from stabilized tenants, as well as complaints and ap-
peal applications from owners claiming hardship in maintaining
their buildings at the permitted rent levels. It is the CAB's job to
interpret the rent stabilization code, and to apply its provisions. To
verify a tenant's complaint the CAB staff makes inspections, or
requests that the Office of Code Enforcement do so. Where the CAB
has no jurisdiction over the subject of a complaint, it will forward
the tenant's application to the appropriate city agency.
The nine members of the CAB are appointed by the Mayor, sub-
ject to the approval of the City Council. 4 Four represent tenants'
interests, four represent owners' interests, and one is an impartial
chairman.65 All of the Board's expenses, including the $15,000 salary
for each of its members and the $35,000 salary of the chairman, are
paid by the RSA.66 However, despite city appointment and RSA
funding, the CAB considers itself an independent public body. 7
C. Vacancy Decontrol Laws
In 1971, the New York State Legislature enacted Vacancy Decon-
trol laws 8 which did away with stabilization and rent control for all
apartments becoming vacant on or after July 1, 1971. Vacancy de-
Order No. 10, in The City Record, Sept. 7, 1978, at 2433-34.
62. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(4).
63. RSL § YY51-6.0(b)(3).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. RS CODE § 31.
67. CAB REPORT, supra note 50, at 5.
68. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8581-82 (McKinney Supp. 1971). Under this act, section
8582(2)(i) specifically decontrolled the apartments as they became vacant.
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control was enacted (1) to attack the ills caused by rent controls,
(2) to restore reasonable market incentives for maintenance and
upgrading of housing, (3) to discourage abandonment of housing,
and (4) to establish an atmosphere conducive to massive construc-
tion of new housing by the private sector. 9
The vacancy decontrol laws resulted in the destabilization of ap-
proximately 110,000 rent-stabilized apartments and hotel units over
the next three years. 0 About 400,000 rent controlled units were simi-
larly decontrolled during that period."
Under vacancy decontrol, owners of decontrolled and destabilized
apartments were free to charge their tenants whatever rent the unre-
gulated market would bear. With the vacancy rate in New York City
at its lowest due to increased abandonment of buildings and a mini-
mal amount of new construction," owners under vacancy decontrol
enjoyed a seller's market. When the price of oil increased in 1974,
landlords were able to pass along their increased operating costs to
their unprotected tenants, many of whom were unable to afford the
added burden."s
D. Emergency Tenant Protection Act
In March of 1974, the City Council under the Beame administra-
tion voted unanimously to extend the rent stabilization program for
five years.7 Despite the extension, rent gouging continued un-
abated in apartments destabilized and decontrolled under the Va-
cancy Decontrol laws. 5 In June of 1974, faced with spiraling rents
and a severe housing shortage, the New York State Legislature
passed the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA)5 which took
69. Governor's Memorandum, 1971 N.Y. Laws 2608-10.
70. CAB REPoRT, supra note 50, at 2. Hotel units, however, are covered under a separate
Hotel Code sanctioned by the RSL. See RSL §§ YY51-3.0(1)(e), -6.1.
71. CAB REPoirT, supra note 50, at 2.
72. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1978, § 8, at 8, col. 5.
73. See N.Y. Times, June 29, 1974, at 29, cols. 2-3.
74. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1974, at 1. col. 3.
75. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1974, § 4, at 6, col. 3.
76. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8621-34 (McKinney Supp. 1978), originally enacted as 1974
N.Y. Laws 767, ch. 576. The Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA) expanded the juris-
diction of the RSL to all dwelling units which (a) had previously been subject to the RSL or
the City Rent Law but had become vacancy destabilized or vacancy decontrolled between
1971 and 1973, (b) were built between March 10, 1969 and December 31, 1973, (c) were or
are decontrolled because of owner occupancy, (d) are still subject to the City Rent Law but
become vacant in the future, or (e) were entitled to tax exemption benefits under section 423
1979]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
effect in New York City upon its adoption by the City Council later
that month." This statute totally repealed vacancy decontrol for the
city's destabilized housing stock. On July 1, 1974 it restored 110,000
previously destabilized apartments and hotel units to the rent stabi-
lization system."8
The legislation further modified vacancy decontrol as it applied
to rent-controlled housing by placing approximately 400,000 va-
cancy decontrolled, pre-World War II apartments under rent
stabilization. In addition, the law provided that every vacancy
which occurs in a rent controlled apartment on or after July 1, 1974
will trigger that apartment's immediate transfer into the stabiliza-
tion system."' The ETPA of 1974 also extended rent stabilization
to some 7,500 luxury apartments built between 1969 and 1973 which
had never been subject to any previous rent regulations.'
The ETPA was initially set to expire on June 30, 1976 but was
extended for an additional twelve months by the City Council. In
light of prevailing emergency conditions, the City Council in 1977
extended the ETPA for another four years."
III. Expansion Under ETPA
Since the system's expansion by the ETPA in 1974, rent stabiliza-
tion has become the virtual successor to rent control in New York
City. 3 The system of stabilization which originally had jurisdiction
over fewer than 400,000 newly constructed buildings, presently en-
compasses nearly one million dwelling units of all ages. 4 Because
of the Real Property Tax Law. The ETPA left unprotected any apartments in buildings with
fewer than six units and eliminated from the stabilization stock any unstabilized apartments
in buildings owned or operated by charitable or philanthropic organizations. Id.
77. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1974, at 41, col. 3.
78. CAB REPORT, supra note 50, at 3.
79. Id.
80. Id. See also note 76 supra. Once an apartment was stabilized or restabilized under
the ETPA, future vacancies were not to result in its deregulation.
81. CAB REPORT, supra note 50, at 3.
82. N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1977, at 30, col. 4.
83. According to a 1978 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey, there are fewer than
403,000 rent controlled apartments left in New York City today, as opposed to more than one
million when rent control was first initiated. Crrv oF NEw YORK, [1978] 1A N.Y. Crry
HOUSING & VACANCY SURVEY 1 (table 10001).
84. CAB REPORT, supra note 50, at 2. See generally L.N. BLOOMBERO, THE RENTAL HOUSINo
SITUATION IN NEW YORK Crrv (1975).
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few significant changes have been made in the law since the inclu-
sion of older buildings, the rents and tenancies of all stabilized
buildings today are regulated on a largely uniform basis. 't In addi-
tion, the system's expansion has made enrollment and enforcement
harder to police.
A. Uniform Rent Increases
To effect a system which could be self-implemented, the RSL
provided simple rules to be applied uniformly among the entire
housing stock. These rules, however, often fail to recognize owners'
individual needs. For example, all owners are restricted to the same
percentage increase on rents.
While the control of all rent increases by a common percentage
increase has the appearance of equanimity, it may not be suitable
in all situations .8  Owners of older buildings usually incur greater
expenses for repairs and operating costs than do owners of newer
buildings.8 1 In addition, older buildings have higher fuel and utility
bills,8" primarily due to antiquated heating and plumbing systems.
Furthermore, there exists a higher proportion of dilapidated units
and units with maintenance and equipment deficiencies in the sta-
bilized pre-1947 buildings. Although the RGB now considers statis-
tics on the cost and upkeep of the system's 560,000 older buildings,8 '
and uses a weighted average approach in formulating its uniform
85. "The law is applied uniformly; the distinctions arise from the nature of base date
practices arising in new and old buildings." Letter from Nathaniel Geller, Deputy Direc-
tor/Deputy Counsel of CAB, New York City, December 29, 1978.
86. For an excellent critique of uniform percentage increases for rent controlled buildings,
see OWEN, Rent Controls: Solution or Problem, 41 SASK. L. REV. 3 (1976).
87. "A lower proportion of total expenditures of older buildings is incurred for real estate
taxes and labor costs while a higher proportion is expended on repairs (contract maintenance)
relative to newer buildings in the stabilized stock." Explanatory Statement to RGB Order
No. 9, in The City Record, Aug. 4, 1977, at 2387 col. 2.
88. Studies conducted by the Office of Rent Control in 1977 indicated that fuel and
utilities make up "a much higher proportion of overall operating and maintenance expenses
in the older stock than it does in newer buildings." Id.
89. See RGB Explanatory Statement to Guideline No. 9 (table II) (chart indicating higher
rentals received by owners of newer buildings), in The City Record, Aug. 4, 1977, at 2387,
col. 1. The RGB noted that "the portion of the stabilized stock covered by the original rent
stabilization law, units built after 1947 in larger buildings, has higher per room rents, and
has tenants with higher incomes and lower rent/income ratios than in formerly rent controlled
junits." Id. See also Real Estate Weekly, July 24, 1978, at 13, col. 3 (column by R. Klein,
President, N.Y. Realty Owners Association, noting that "every guidelines established during
the past nine years has been totally inadequate in order to maintain rental housing.").
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guidelines percentages, 0 it does not review operating costs on a case-
by-case basis." The burden to administrators is eased at the ex-
pense of older building owners.
The stabilization system provides hardship and other increases
above the guidelines percentage for which an owner may apply to
the CAB when the standard increase is inadequate. However, own-
ers in greatest need of these additional increases are often unaware
of them, or unable to fulfill their technical requirements which may
presuppose the hiring of an accountant, or the obtaining of tenants'
written consent. While more complicated and demanding proce-
dures such as those for comparative hardship increases may merely
mean an added nuisance or expense for large scale realty companies
with lawyers and accountants, for the small scale, unsophisticated
owner it can be a nightmare entailing expenses beyond his means. "
B. Delivery of Services
The CAB has indicated that "some of the system's elements are
not wholly geared to the problems presented by housing on the
lowest runds of the ladder by age and physical condition.""' In some
instances, owners of very old pre-war buildings are unable, some-
times unwilling, to fulfill the self-regulatory standards and volun-
tary compliance aspects of the system."
These owners often do not strictly adhere to requirements to fill
and maintain base date services. 5 Because of their late entrance
into the system of unfamiliarity with its requirements, they have
not maintained the kinds of records RSL requires for all of the years
dating back to the base date."
The problem is further complicated by the presence of "hybrid"
90. See Explanatory Statements to RGB Orders No. 9, supra note 87.
91. However, such a case-by-case review would be contra to the intent of the law which
is to provide expeditious resolution of disputes arising under it. "Many of the system's rules
and regulations were designed for implementation by owners and tenants directly so as to
encourage negotiation between the parties directly thus eliminating the need for administra-
tive processing except where disputes arise." Mayor's Task Force on Federal Pre-Emption of
Local Rent Laws in New York City, Sept. 1, 1977, at 3, in CAB REPORT, Appendix N.
92. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1975, at 31, col. 6.
93. CAB REPORT, supra note 50, at 3.
94. Id.
95. Letter from N. Geller, supra note 85. See also text accompanying notes 172-200 infra.
96. Id.
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buildings, those with some units still subject to standard rent con-
trol while other apartments in the same complex are subject to rent
stabilization. This dual system occurs most often in the once en-
tirely rent-controlled buildings and is responsible for the resultant
confusion of small-time owners who must then contend with not
only one beauracracy, but with two.'
C. Enforcement
The number of cases received and processed by the CAB in-
creased tenfold" after the ETPA's enactment. The Board's backlog
of cases also grew substantially." However, since 1976 the CAB kept
pace with its increased volume and substantially reduced its back-
log as well.'°° If the results of judicial review of CAB opinions pres-
ents any indication of CAB's ability to fairly resolve disputes, the
CAB's record is respectable. Of the more than 7,000 opinions issued
by the Board as of the end of 1977, less than 350 were appealed.""
However, the administrative resolution of these cases does not
always result in owner compliance. According to the CAB, more
than 20 per cent of the orders issued are ignored by the owners or
are performed unsatisfactorily.'0 Failure to comply can be un-
intentional; more than half of all rent overcharges are the result
of owners incorrectly computing the allowable guidelines increases
for his apartments.0 3
Non-compliance can also be intentional; efforts to evade the sanc-
97. "The dual system exists, often within the same building, because of the tangle of state
and local laws enacted over the years." N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1978, at 59, col. 1. Some
buildings became hybrid because of an owner's failure to register each of his apartments
individually with the rent stabilization system as required, at the same time the owner
himself registered for membership with the RSA. See text accompanying note 115 infra. This
did not forfeit the owner's status in the stabilization system, but did subject to rent control
those individual apartments which he failed to register. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
Furthermore, buildings which initially were exclusively rent controlled have since become
hybrid due to the ETPA switching controlled apartments into the stabilization stock upon a
change in tenancy. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
98. CAB REPoirr, supra note 50, at 10.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 11. Of those, two hundred and sixty Article 78 proceedings were initiated by
owners, 73 by tenants. One hundred seven were later withdrawn, 96 upheld, 20 reversed, 39
remanded by consent, and 5 remanded by the court. Fourteen of 26 recent appeals were still
pending in the higher courts as of the end of 1977. Id.
102. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1978, §8, at 8, col. 4.
103. Id. at col. 1.
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tions of stabilization are not unheard of. However, willfu.llness is
difficult to prove under the stabilization law. In addition, the threat
of expulsion from the stabilization system and placement under rent
control has, with rent control's demise, become a rarely exerted
penalty. 04 Thus, except in the case of chronic offenders the CAB
usually opts for less stringent penalties, fines and rent rollbacks, to
impose upon non-complying owners. Intention becomes irrevelant
in CAB determinations and the deterrent impact of expulsion is
weakened. Apparently, the CAB believes that using the expulsion
order sparingly better serves the purposes of tenant protection since
expelled units, until officially transferred to the jurisdiction of the
rent control system, receive little protection from any of the city's
rent laws.
D. Enrollment
Enrollment of owners into the stabilization system is another
area in which the threat of rent control has proven ineffective. The
addition of half-a-million housing units to the system has height-
ened the problem by diminishing further the coercive effect of rent
control.
To reap the benefit of periodic rent increases under stabilization,
an owner must first register with the RSA.'05 The law is clear on this
and indicates that owners who fail to register become subject to the
harsher restraints of the city's rent control program.1°1 However, by
not registering, many owners simply escape the jurisdiction of any
of the city rent laws.
Allegedly, enrollment of owners in 1969 was virtually 100%1'1 with
104. The New York Times in 1978 indicated that no dwelling unit in the history of the
RSL had ever been withdrawn from the stabilization stock and placed under rent control for
non-compliance. Id. at cols. 3-5. However, the Deputy Director of the CAB indicated that
approximately twenty-five orders expelling 250 units from the stabilization system have been
issued by the Board for owners' failure to comply with CAB directives. Letter from N. Geller,
supra note 85.
105. RSL § YY51-4.0(a).
106. Id. The legislation specifically provides that
[diwelling units covered by this law . . . shall be deemed to be housing accomoda-
tions subject to control under the provisions of title Y of chapter fifty-one of the
administrative code [rent control] . . . unless the owner of such units is a member
in good standing of any association registered with the housing and development
association pursuant to section YY51-6.0 or section YY51-6.1.
Id. But see note 104 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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HDA actively supervising the system's total enrollment.'"' However,
by 1975 the results of a city census'"1 indicated that the owners of
over 100,000 apartments in New York City had probably avoided
the City rent laws by failing to register their apartments.10
Under the ETPA, effectively enrolling owners in the stabilization
system became a challenge. The ETPA extended enrollment to rent
controlled units as they became vacancy decontrolled."' Vacancy
decontrolled apartments which became stabilized had to be regis-
tered with the RSA if in a building with six or more dwelling units."'
However, because these units became eligible for enrollment at
different times and no requirement existed then or now for reporting
a vacancy decontrolled unit with HDA, it has become increasingly
difficult for HDA to police the enrollment of these units."' Those
units not enrolled cannot be assessed for any dues that would other-
wise be required of them under the rent stabilization law and
code," 4 nor can the RSL be enforced against them.
In addition to requiring an owner to register himself and his build-
ings with the RSA, the code further requires stabilized owners to
register each of their individual stabilized units with the RSA. ' 5
Failure to register each apartment individually does not forfeit the
owner's status in the stabilization system, but theoretically subjects
to rent control those individual apartments which the owner failed
to register."' 6 Although the CAB acknowledges that-an owner today
must still enroll each individual unit with the RSA for the apart-
ment to become stabilized, the CAB abrogates that rule by enter-
taining jurisdiction of complaints filed by tenants of units not regis-
tered with the RSA.1" The CAB's action grants the protection of
stabilization to more tenants, but defeats express registration re-
quirements and puts the owner on notice that failure to register will
108. CAB REPORT, supra note 50, at 11.
109. CrrY OF NEw YORK, [1975] 2A NEW YORK CrITY HOUSING & VACANCY SURVEY 1-75
(control-status categories by borough). The most recent survey, compiled in MARCUSE, RENTAL
HOUSING IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1979), confirms the results of the 1975 survey.
110. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1976, at 1, cols. 5-6.
111. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
112. RSL § YY51-4.0(a).
113. CAB REPORT, supra note 50, at 11-12.
114. In 1977, the CAB was forced to operate on an austerity budget because the RSA failed
to collect dues from all of its enrolled members. CAB REPORT, supra note 50, at 13.
115. RSL § YY51-4.0(a).
116. Id. See note 106 supra.
117. Letter from N. Geller, supra note 85.
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not necessarily condemn his apartments to the jurisdiction of rent
control. More effective and mandatory registration requirements are
needed if the law, which depends for its success on the extent to
which its rules are voluntarily complied with, is to be implemented
to its fullest capacity.
Another policy followed by RSL administrators rendering im-
potent the threat of expulsion is late enrollment."' Under the RSL
an owner is required to register with the RSA thirty days after his
building becomes stabilized or thirty days within becoming owner
of a stabilized building."' Owners of buildings which became
subject to stabilization by virtue of the ETPA are given sixty days
to register with the RSA.2 0
Owners who fail to register with the RSA within the deadline
period should be rent controlled. However, section twelve of the
code provides that owners who miss the registration deadline may
apply for late enrollment, subject to HDA's approval.' Further-
more, the membership of late enrollers is often made retroactive to
the beginning of their ownership or the apartment's stabilization.,"
No provisions authorizing late enrollment or retroactive member-
ship are found in the RSL or the ETPA, yet the HDA grants the
opportunity to owners, frustrating the rent control office's attempts
to legally assume jurisdiction over unregistered apartments. Again,
the threat of rent control is enfeebled by provisions in the code and
actions of the RSL's administrators.
E. Dissension Among Landlords
The failure of stabilization to account in any significant way for
the fundamentally different needs of the owners of the system's
older housing created a tense division of interests between newer
building owners and older building owners in RSA. 23 Internal dis-
sension intensified upon the older building owners obtaining a ma-
jority of RSA's membership in 1977, and culminated in a full-scale
proxy battle waged by "dissident" directors of the industry against
incumbent management in 1978.124 The dissidents, speaking for sev-
118. RS CODE § 12.
119. RSL § YY51-4.0(a).
120. Id.
121. RS CODE § 12.
122. See, e.g., CAB Opinion No. (late enrollment retroactive to lease commencement).
123. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1978, § 2, at 12, col. 3.
124. Industry leaders deplore such fractionalization because they believe that all owners
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eral major landlord groups in New York City, charged that the RSA
Board of Directors, composed almost exclusively at that time of
newer, luxury apartment building owners, 25 were "not responsive to
the needs of thousands of owners of older apartment buildings.' ' 2
On August 2, 1978, the dissidents succeeded in electing a majority
of their spokesmen to the RSA Board of Directors."'
The most severe criticism of the incumbent RSA management
was the association's failure to take a more active pro-owner posi-
tion in opposing the RGB's annual rent guidelines. 2 Dissidents
claimed that the rental increases were inadequate and failed to take
into account the greater expenses incurred by owners of older build-
ings. 2 They suggested that RSA was lax in protesting because the
incumbents were owners of newer luxury buildings who were satis-
fied with the high rents they were already receiving.
RSA incumbents responded that the dissidents were demanding
are burdened equally by laws such as the RSL which they claim "destructively limits the
rents they may collect and otherwise threatens their investments." N.Y. Times, May 11, 1978,
§ 2, at 12, col. 4.
125. "The existing Board of Directors and Officers represent the luxury East Side apart-
ment houses who have been getting market rents and are thus satisfied with conditions as
they exist." Real Estate Weekly, June 19,1978, at 9, col.1. "The leadership has never changed
to reflect that increase in older units." Id. at 7, col. 2.
The RSA responded by noting that the RSA's 24 directors consisted of landlords with
diverse property interests including pre and post-World War II units, luxury, and lower rent
apartments. "Most of these directors own and manage residential real estate of all types, rent
controlled and rent stabilized, and are therefore fully aware of the problems faced by the
industry." Real Estate Weekly, June 5, 1978, at 9, col. 2. See also N.Y. Times, May 11, §2,
at 12, col. 3-4.
126. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1978, §2, at 12, col. 3, and Real Estate Weekly, July 24, 1978,
at 3, col. 2, (column by S. Zuckerman). The author further noted that the RSA "has provided
no more service to the industry than the Office of Rent Control. Yet the Rent Control Office
is an adversary organization whereas RSA is supposedly an owner's group." Id.
In an earlier column, Mr. Zuckerman speculated:
Perhaps this is why the fat cats of RSA have not fought harder for the industry. The
present RSA Board overwhelmingly consists of an elite group of super-owners of luxury
buildings. These are the power brokers, the aristocrats, those with a multitude of
dealings with the City of New York. They are the people who, when the chips are down,
dare not rock the boat for fear of jeopardizing their own lucrative relationships.
Real Estate Weekly, July 10, 1978, at 9, col. 1.
127. Real Estate Weekly, Aug. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 4. The election, which was held at the
Annual Meeting of the RSA at the Roosevelt Hotel in New York City on August 2, 1978, drew
the largest turnout of owners in the nine-year history of RSA.
128. See, e.g., Real Estate Weekly, June 19, 1978, at 9, cols. 1-2. (main issue behind proxy
battle "the failure of the existing Board of Directors and Officers to get more rent for the rent
stabilized sector").
129. See notes 87 & 88 supra.
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action which the RSA could not legally take.' The incumbent man-
agement warned that the more active RSA role in city housing af-
fairs desired by the dissidents could lead to revocation of RSA's
charter and a return of the entire stabilized housing stock to the rent
control system. " '
The RSA officers further contended that the dissidents' attitude
was contrary to the profile which RSA was obligated under law to
maintain.' One head of the association noted that the "RSA is a
creature and creation of statute, and unlike other real estate trade
organizations, RSA is bound by the parameters of this statute. The
Association must obey the letter of the law or else face dissolution
of rent stabilization and widespread rent control.' ' 33
In addition to internal dissension, extension of the RSL over ten
years pitted the owners against the other stabilization agencies in
efforts to invalidate or terminate the law. Such action may very well
be contrary to RSA's legal obligations under the RSL. The imme-
diate purpose of the 1969 statute was to "prevent exactions of un-
just, unreasonable, and oppressive rents and rental agreements."'' 4
The law was also expressly geared towards a smooth transition from
regulation back to a "normal market of free bargaining between
landlord and tenant.' ' 35
Free market transition seems to dominate the thoughts of the real
estate industry. One RSA spokesman referred to the goal of free
market transition in explaining why CAB was permitted to renew
its lease for prime Fifth Avenue office space, rather than enter a new
ten year lease for less expensive headquarters:
[B]y entering into a long term lease, the real estate industry would have
signaled legislators and the public that the real estate industry is resigned
to the continuation of rent stabilization. Such an action would be interpreted
130. Real Estate Weekly, July 24, 1978, at 4, cols. 1-2 (letter from H. Liebman, Chairman,
RSA).
131. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1978, at 18, col. 1. See also Real Estate Weekly, June 5, 1978,
at 7, col. 2 (statement by former RSA president M.I. Sroge, that because RSA is charged by
statute with the responsibility of self-regulation, "this in itself limits militancy on our part").
132. RSL § YY51-6.0(b)(5). The section provides that the RSA must be "of such character
that it will be able to carry out the purposes of this law."
133. Real Estate Weekly, supra note 130. The chairman of RSA alo indicated that al-
though RSA is bound to administer the stabilization program even-handedly, it has not
remained entirely neutral and impartial. Id.
134. RSL § YY51-1.0.
135. Id.
[Vol. VII
NYC RENT STABILIZATION LAW
as implicit acceptance of a permanent. ETPA. The industry would not and
will not concede that rent stabilization is to be everlasting.",
Clearly, this objective is not contrary to the purposes of the stabi-
lization law since it is, in fact, the ultimate goal behind the legisla-
tion. Still, it is neither the exclusive nor the immediate goal of the
RSL. Tenant protection was the foremost concern of the legislature
in enacting the RSL,' 31 and it remains the law's primary focus today.
The inevitable question is whether a system which provides for
self-regulation by landlords is capable of protecting the interests of
the city's tenants. At the law's inception, owners showed little en-
thusiasm for this responsibility. They joined the RSA reluctantly,' 38
under the threat of rent ontrol for failure to comply.13 As required
under law, they drew up a code for tenant protection but left it
riddled with ambiguities and loopholes.'4" Time and again, members
of RSA have instituted lawsuits seeking to invalidate the stabiliza-
tion law as unconstitutional.'
Some observers find these actions indicative of a recalcitrant atti-
tude on the part of stabilized owners. Landlord's self-policing of the
system has been compared to the fox guarding the henhouse,112 and
136. Real Estate Weekly, June 19, 1978, at 6, col. 3. A similar view was expressed during
an interview with Sheldon Katz, supra note 12.
137. See legislative findings, RSL § YY51-1.0.
138. See Law of 1969, supra note 12, at 156 and text accompanying n. 4.
139. RSL § YY51-4.0(a).
140. See, e.g., notes 55 & 56 supra.
141. See Fifty Cent. Pk. West Corp. v. Bastien, 60 Misc. 2d 195, 302 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1969) (unconstitutional delegation of power to'private association of landlords),
aff'd, 64 Misc. 2d 911 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1970) (finding it unnecessary to decide on question
of unconstitutionality); Patterson v. Daquet, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1970, at 14, col. 7 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y.) (unconstitutionally required landlords to "voluntarily" join association of property
owners); Somerset-Wilshire Apts., Inc. v. Lindsay, 304 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (uphold-
ing constitutionality of RSL); 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 261 N.E.2d 647,
313 N.Y.S.2d 733, appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 962 (1970) (RSL constitutional); Housing and
Development Assoc. v. Community Housing Improvement Program, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 977
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975) (rent control and rent stabilization laws unconstitutional as adminis-
tered), rev'd on other grounds, 90 Misc.2d 813, 815 (App. T. 2d Dep't), aff'd, 59 A.D.2d 773
(2d Dep't 1977).
Stabilized landlords continue to initiate judicial proceedings attacking the constitution-
ality of the RSL as it is currently administered. See Benson Realty Corp. v. Beame, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 4, 1978, at 13, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.) (action seeking declaratory judgment that rent control
and rent stabilization laws, as currently administered, be declared unconstitutional, could
proceed to trial on merits); Rent Stabilization Ass'n v. Rent Guidelines Board, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 29, 1978, at 4, col. 3 (App. T. 1st Dep't) (guidelines remanded to RGB to correct
procedural defect).
142. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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tenants claim that the industry cannot be expected to zealously
protect the public interest when its eventual goal is the elimination
of the law itself. Still, the possibility exists that the corruptive influ-
ence of self-regulation has been overemphasized.
The New York Court of Appeals, holding the law constitutional
in 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay"3 in 1969, expressed the view that
self-policing could be beneficial to the system:
That members of a complex industry play a part in guiding government
to a fair regulation of the industry is an obvious advantage as long as govern-
ment keeps the ultimate controls in its own hands. The knowledge and expe-
rience of the industry may be of valuable assistance to administration.
The cooperation of the industry is more likely when the industry plays a
responsible part in the regulation itself than when it stands outside and
takes the prescriptions of public authority when handed down as the real
estate industry does in the regulations under Title Y111 [rent control].
[Wlhatever delegation may be said to have come down to the Real Estate
Industry Association [RSA] described in this statute, closely circumscribed
and regulated as this is, no one could seriously entertain a fear that govern-
ment has yielded any real sovereign power.Y4 5
The court of appeals based its optimistic stance partially on the
fact that the system's boards were theoretically independent of one
another,' serving as an effective system of checks and balances. By
providing for equal representation of adverse interests on their
boards,"7 CAB and RGB decisions maintain a measure of fairness
and impartiality. And although independent, the agencies are ulti-
mately subject to governmental guidance and control through HDA.
The RSA is subject to supervision and reprimand from both HDA
and CAB."8 The landlord or tenant dissatisfied with a CAB ruling
may initiate an Article 78 proceeding in court to contest it.' The
143. 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 261 N.E.2d 647, 313 N.Y.S.2d 733,
appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 962 (1970).
144. Id. at 131, 132.
145. Id. at 132.
146. See, e.g., CAB REPORT, supra note 50, at 4, 6. Furthermore, the N.Y. Court of
Appeals indicated that "it is not an uncommon practice for a regulated industry to provide
the funds expended by a public agency in its regulation." 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27
N.Y.2d 124, 134, 261 N.E.2d 647, 652, 313 N.Y.S.2d 733, 740 (1969). Examples of other
industries which similarly provide the funds for their supervision, include the insurance
industry (INsuRANCE LAW § 32-a), public utilities (PUBLIC SERVICE LAW § 18-a), and the
banking industry (BANKING LAW § 17 subd. 3). Id.
147. See text accompanying notes 58-60 & 64-65 supra.
148. RSL §§YY51-4.0(a), (c), -6.0(b)(2), (4), (c)(10).
149. N.Y. Civ. PAc. LAW §§ 7801-06 (judicial proceeding against public body or officer).
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RGB is required by law to accept for review all pertinent data sub-
mitted to it by outside agencies and individuals, to arrive at reason-
ably most accurate guidelines. 50
Still, these measures may be inadequate to secure compliance
and impartial administration of the law. One appellate. justice
suggested that the CAB, despite its division into a landlord's
faction, a tenant's faction, and an impartial chair, is really no more
than a "tripartite facade." He stated that:
The statute provides for virtual self-regulation by the industry ... with-
out any real intervention or supervision by an effective, functioning and
adequately staffed independent governmental agency. Indeed, and despite
the tripartite facade of the CAB, the industry appears to be acting as both
judge and jury. One recalls the venerable maxim of Pascal: "No one should
be Judge in his own cause."''
The dissidents' demands for greater input into CAB and RGB
decisions would seem to imply that RSA prefers infiltration and
partiality to independence. Yet independence, as a check and bal-
ance on each board's power bloc, is essential to the fair and effec-
tive functioning of the stabilization system. Whether the election of
a majority of dissidents to the RSA Board of Directors will lead to
the downfall of self-regulation depends largely on their actions and
the extent to which they overstep legal limitations imposed upon
them.
IV. Extension of the Law: Base Date Provisions
The law's extension over ten years has not only increased strife
among owners and within the system as a whole, but has also led
to the breakdown of certain provisions in the law and code. Some
provisions have become useless, others increasingly technical and
complicated. The base date provision is a prominent example of
declining practicality in the face of long-term extension.
Originally a simple system for computing stabilized rents, there
currently exist twelve categories of apartments, each with a differ-
ent base date. 5 In addition, one building may have different base
dates for building-wide services and for individual apartment serv-
150. RSL §§ YY51-5.0(b)(2) & (3).
151. Windsor Park Tenants' Ass'n. v. CAB, 59 A.D.2d 121, 625, 397 N.Y.S.2d 828, 845
(2d Dep't 1977). (Hawkins, J., concurring).
152. See CAB, Tenant's and Owner's Rights and Duties Under The Rent Stabilization
Law 4-7 (1978).
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ices, and the base dates for two neighboring units may differ as
well.'53 Furthermore, the limitation formula is highly technical to
inexperienced owners. Owners must have in their possession all
lease records back to the base date.'" To compute the legal rent, the
limitation formula must be applied to each year in which a new
lease was entered. Owners, unaware of the formula or unable to
properly apply it, may lose out on valuable increases or subject
,their tenants to incorrect rentals. Tenants aware of the formula
may apply to the CAB for a rent reduction if the Board finds the
current rent charged to be improper. There is no statute of limita-
tions on rent rollbacks; thus, tenants are not penalized for late
discoveries of overcharges. However, as the allowable increase is
merely a maximum which may not be exceeded, the owner inadver-
tantly charging a lower rent will have no recourse by which to recoup
lost earnings. The following section further discusses these short-
comings.
A. Rental Charges
Under the stabilization code, guidelines increases are computed
on a percentage basis above the rent charged and paid on the base
date. If the purpose of rent regulation is to prevent rent "gouging"
by landlords, then the regulation is effective only to the extent that
no gouging existed on the base date. "
City census bureau studies show that despite rent control and
rent stabilization, New York City rents have risen more than three
times as fast as tenant incomes since 1970.116 Over half of the city's
tenants pay more than twenty five percent of their income for rent,
including half-a-million households that pay more than thirty-five
percent of their income.'57 The studies further show that while
rents have increased 23.3 percent since 1975, owners' operating and
maintenance costs, which generally account for fifty to eighty per-
153. See RS CODE § 2(i).
154. See RS CODE § 42.
155. "[W]e are dealing with past buildings which in many cases have rent inequities
built into them because, e.g., they came on the market at a time of glut or one of shortage."
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, 2 PRAcTIcE UNDER THE NEW RENT STABILIZATION LAW at 48. Further
inequities exist because many tenants paid high increases for apartments leased during the
three years of vacancy decontrol before the ETPA was enacted. See N.Y. Times, July 15, 1974,
at 28, col. 2.
156. N.Y. Crr, 1975 CENSUS BUREAU STUDY.
157. Id.
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cent of rental property costs, have gone up by only 15.3 percent. 5"
One key suggestion from the studies is that gouging during periods
of rent control and during decontrol has created excessive base rents
upon which later increases are computed. 5' And to compensate for
what they still consider inadequate rentals, owners continue charg-
ing tenants rentals higher than those permitted under law. 60 De-
spite stabilization, gouging continues to thrive in New York City.",
Once overcharging is discovered by the CAB, penalties imposed
are very light.6 2 A landlord found guilty of overcharging is ordered
by the CAB to roll the rent back to the legal limit and to make a
refund, either in rent credit or in cash. However, the refund does not
include interest and punitive action is rarely taken against the
landlord."3
Furthermore, although a landlord cannot legally evict a tenant for
complaining to the CAB, a landlord is in a position to make it
unpleasant for a complaining tenant to actively pursue enforcement
of a CAB directive. Section 52 of the code forbids an owner from
harassing a tenant by interfering with or disturbing the "comfort,
repose, peace or quiet of the tenant in use and occupancy" of his
apartment, but few owners have been expelled for harassment. The
stabilization law depends, in large part, on tenant initiation of com-
plaints. Though the code protects tenants from owner retaliation
for pursuit of legal rights, tenants in a seller's market are intimi-
dated and may refrain from complaining about illegal rent over-
charges or non-compliance with a rent rollback order." 4
Tenants who do complain often are confronted with an anoma-
158. MARCUSE, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, (1979).
159. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1976, at 1, cols. 5-6. For other suggestions from the 1975 survey,
see text accompanying note 110 supra, which indicated that owners of more than 100,000
apartments had probably avoided the rent laws altogether by failing to register their apart-
ments as required under law.
160. Most gouging occurs in stabilized buildings. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1978, § 8, at
4, col. 1.
161. See Bordewich, Real Estate: How High The Boom?, New York Magazine, Dec. 11,
1978, at 62.
"A lot of people are doing it . .. [aind I'm not so sure it's wrong. If a landlord's
weighed down with a lot of rent-controlled tenants in his building, he's losing money
on them, and he's going to try to make up the difference by charging what the market
will bear for the other apartments."
Id. at 65, cols. 2-3 (emphasis added).
162. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1978, §8, at 4, col. 4.
163. Id.
164. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1978, § 8, at 4, col. 1.
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lous situation inherent in the RSL. A clause in the 1969 code pro-
tects tenants against overcharges by requiring landlords to attach
to a new lease on an apartment the name of the prior tenant and
the rent payable under the previous lease.' 5 However, owners are
usually lax in doing so and the CAB does not keep its own lease
records, relying instead on landlords to provide the previous leases
when questions on legal rents arise.' 6 More often than not these
leases are never produced and the CAB is forced to rely on tenants'
allegations to determine the proper rent. The tenant in such a situa-
tion wins a lower rental by virtue of an ignored and unenforceable
provision in the law, rather than through the provisions' explicit
design to benefit the tenant by coercing owner compliance. More
recently, the CAB has attempted to rectify this situation by refusing
the owner the benefit of the latest guidelines increases until the
requested lease records have been provided." 7 This seems a fairer
penalty in that it does not depend exclusively upon tenant hearsay.
Under the ETPA, a system was devised to alleviate built-in rent
inequities. Tenants under this system could, in certain newly stabi-
lized apartments, negotiate a "first rent" with their landlord.' This
rent would then be subject to a Tenant Fair Market Rental Appeal'
if the tenant believed he was paying more than the rent paid for
comparable apartments. Because of the "comparable apartment"
provision, however, tenants in these newly stabilized apartments
usually end up paying whatever the market will bear. In addition,
tenant groups have claimed that the appeal procedure is too compli-
cated and difficult to be of much practical use to the average ten-
ant. 7
0
165. RS CODE §42(A)(1). Until recently, the CAB was not even aware that this section of
the code required an owner to attach a rider to a new tenant's lease, indicating his right to
prior lease records for the apartment. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1978, § 8, at 4, col 2. Since then
CAB opinions have reflected their change in awareness. See, e.g., CAB Opinion No. 9129.
166. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1978, § 8, at 4, col. 4. See, e.g., Fresh Meadows Assoc. v. CAB,
64 A.D.2d 548, 407 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1st Dep't 1978) (owner who failed to provide lease records
for CAB inspection ordered by court to produce them).
167. CAB Opinion No. 9129.
168. RS CODE § 25.
169. Id.
170. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1975, at 31, col. 7. Section 25(b) of the Code provides that a
tenant must fill out a Tenant Fair Market Rent Adjustment application with the CAB within
90 days after the tenant receives an Initial Legal Regulated Rent notice from his landlord.
This time limit puts tenants in older buildings, which are mostly the object of the provision,
into a tight spot since many of them are aged, alien, or undereducaied and either fail to
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All base date rent problems are further exacerbated by the peri-
odic percentage increases sanctioned under the RSL. Whatever ine-
quities existed in the base date rent are heightened upon each sign-
ing of a new lease. The Metropolitan Council on Housing, a tenants'
group, has observed that the increases could, conceivably, go on
forever. '
B. Services
Under the stabilization code an owner must continue to provide
the tenant with those services he provided, or was required to pro-
vide, on the base date.' This requirement was intended to prevent
an owner from cutting costs and evading rent restrictions by dimin-
ishing or deleting services he earlier provided to his tenants.
1. Determining the Services Required
Although the law prohibits owners from giving fewer services
under a new lease than under the old, this provision is virtually
meaningless unless the prospective tenant can discover what serv-
ices the landlord had been providing on the base date.' Under the
law an owner is required to show a new tenant the previous lease to
the apartment,' but this does not tell the new tenant what services
were required under that lease.
Furthermore, the CAB has no simple way of determining what
services were provided to the previous tenant. Unlike rent control,'
there is no provision under the RSL or the ETPA requiring an owner
to register such information with any of the system's agencies. Thus,
where no records or evidence is presented, the CAB is forced to base
its conclusions as to decrease in service upon mere presumptions.
read the small-print time requirements for filing, or cannot read it, causing them to forfeit
their rights under the Code.
171. Letter from J. Benedict, supra note 12.
172. RS Code §2(m) provides that required services consist of
[tihat space and those services which were furnished or were required to be furnished
for the dwelling unit on [the base date] and all additional services provided or re-
quired to be provided thereafter. These shall to the extent so furnished or required to
be furnished, include repairs, decorating and maintenance, the furnishing of light,
heat, hot and cold water, telephone, elevator service, removal of refuse and janitorial
services and ancillary services including but not limited to garage space and service,
protective services and recreational facilities.
173. Law of 1969, supra note 12, at 174; N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1978, § 8, at 4, col. 4.
174. RS CODE §42(A)(2).
175. See N.Y. CITv RENT, EVICTION & REHABILITATION REGULATIONS §41, in NEW YORK RENT
CONTROL 449 (J. Rasch ed. 1968).
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One such presumption is based upon the owner's failure to supply
the Board with requested records. A failure to provide records leads
to the Board's presumption that the tenant's allegation of de-
creased services is true. Similarly, the Board presumes a decrease
in services where inspection shows that the premises are not being
properly maintained.
Recently, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
was faced with the problem "' "inherent in the Rent Stabilization
Law, of how to determine whether there has been a decrease in
services under the Rent Stabilization Code."' 77 In In re Fresh
Meadows"' the tenants complained that the premises were not
being properly maintained. The CAB inspected, found improper
maintenance, and ordered the owner to correct the condition by
restoring base date porter services-all without knowing what
porter services were provided on the base date or what porter ser-
vice was being provided now. Special term annulled CAB's deter-
mination on the ground that it was without "rational basis" since
(1) CAB relied upon the owner's failure to supply it with data to
determine whether there had been a diminution in base date ser-
vices, and (2) the directive to restore base date services lacked any
objective criteria upon which compliance could be ascertained. 7'
On appeal to the appellate division, the matter was remanded to the
CAB for a further determination of base date services,""' based upon
the base date records of the premises' prior owner." But in remand-
ing, the majority of the court approved the CAB finding decreased
services by implication where staff inspections revealed improper
maintenance of the premises.''
One justice strongly dissented, observing that "[t]he Code does
not authorize the respondent [CAB] to make determinations based
upon a general lack of maintenance or any other arbitrary standards
that might be formulated by individual inspectors."'' The dissenter
176. In re Howard-Carol Tenants' Ass'n, 64 A.D.2d 546, 406 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st Dep't
1978); In re Fresh Meadows Assoc., 64 A.D.2d 548, 407 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1st Dep't 1978).
177. N.Y.L.J., July 26, 1978, at 4, cols. 3-4 (referring to section 2(m) of the rent stabiliza-
tion code which mandates that services be maintained at the same level provided on May
31, 1968).
178. In re Fresh Meadows Assoc., 64 A.D.2d 548, 407 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1st Dep't 1978).
179. Id. at 548.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 550. (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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believed that decreased service should be found only upon an ex-
press showing through records or other evidence that the service
itself has been decreased. He indicated that lack of cooperation by
the owner, for example failure to provide records, could not, in and
of itself, "affirmatively establish the base level of services for a
particular building nor does it assist the respondent [CAB] in for-
mulating an order directing that mainentance be upgraded to the
base level."' 3
Finally, the dissenting justice astutely observed that
[als the base date becomes more removed, in time, it will become increas-
ingly more difficult to prove the base level of services in any rent stabilized
building, even with the full cooperation of all concerned. The Stabilization
Association should take cognizance of that fact and set up, with the approval
of HDA, alternative criteria for determing whether a stabilized building is
in disrepair.'u
2. Non-Essentiality Of The Services
The remoteness in time of the base date creates unfairness in
other respects as well. The stabilization law is temporary in scope
but the longer it is extended, the more buying patterns and concepts
of necessities change. Without revisions corresponding to society's
and the economy's changing demands, what constituted a vital
service in 1969 or 1974 may no longer be valid five years later, and
even less so ten or fifteen years later.15
In fact, the stabilization code makes no reference to any essential
services which the owner is required to provide. 8 While an owner
is required to abide by the city's Health Code' 7 and Multiple Dwell-
ing Law,'88 the stabilization code itself does not obligate the owner
to provide any specified services other than a painting of the prem-
ises every three years' 9 and all "base date services." Base date
services need not be essential, necessary, or even significant for an
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Interview with Sheldon Katz, supra note 12. By retaining the 1968 and 1974 base
dates, the base date services which an owner is obligated to provide may become less vital to
the adequate maintenance of the tenant's apartment years later. Id.
186. See RS CODE §2(m).
187. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 1706, ch. 60.
188. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW §§ 1-367 (McKinney 1974).
189. RS CoDE §2(m) provides in part that "[o]wners shall comply with the requirement
of the Housing Maintenance Code that each dwelling unit must be painted at least once every
three years."
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owner to be required to continue providing them.9" The only re-
quirement is that the owner have provided them on the base date,
or at any time thereafter. Thus, required services under the RSL
have included non-essential services from egg trays and meat
keeper compartments in refrigerators' and ash trays in the lobby, 2
to sandboxes in adjacent parks' and toothbrush racks in the ten-
ant's bathroom. 9 ' Obviously, a provision which requires the CAB to
expend its quasi-judicial energies deliberating over the owner's
obligation to provide these minor items, impairs the CAB's effec-
tiveness at safeguarding more vital tenant interests.
3. Charges For Base Date Services
Although a landlord may not charge a tenant for services pro-
vided gratuitously on the base date,"' he may charge the tenant
for services which he is now providing but which he was not provid-
ing on the base date,' or for those services for which he charged on
the base date.'97 Services accompanied by a charge on the base date
are known under the law as "ancillary" services. 9" They are required
services and are considered part of the rental for the purpose of
computing guidelines increases.'
An owner may charge a tenant for new services added since the
base date, if the tenant granted written permission to the owner for
such additional service.2 0 However, an owner may not begin to
charge a tenant for a service which he was providing free to the
tenant on the base date, even if new tenants in the building are
paying new service charges for the same service. Thus, a tenant
using an air conditioner free of charge on the base date will be
permitted to continue using it free of charge despite the added bur-
den of its operation on the landlord's pocketbook because of rising
electricity costs. It is of no consequence that the tenant's neighbors
190. J.M. STRIKER & A.O. SHAPIRO, SUPER TENANT 131 (1978).
191. CAB Opinion No. 4223.
192. CAB Opinion No. 6719.
193. CAB Opinion No. 3090.
194. CAB Opinion No. 1316.
195. RS CODE §2(m)(2).
196. RS CODE §20(c).
197. RS CODE §2(m)(1)(a), (b), (c).
198. RS CODE §2(m)(i).
199. Id.
200. See RS CODE § 20(c).
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who moved in after the base date may be paying for the very same
service. The landlord who failed to assess a tenant for the cost of a
service on the base date, under the stabilization code's base date
provisions suffers the economic consequences for years to come.
Base date services are not the only services which an owner is
required to provide. Many maintenance standards for stabilized
buildings are set by the Housing Mainentance and Preservation
Code20 ' while other requirements come from the Board of Health. 02
These services are often vital to an apartment's upkeep but because
they fall outside the scope of stabilization's express requirements,
the CAB is powerless to enforce them. The most CAB can do is refer
these complaints to the proper city agency. In addition, some re-
quirements within the realm of rent stabilization's jurisdiction, for
example, the proper upkeep of elevators, can, theoretically, only be
enforced by some outside agency such as HDA's Office of Code
Enforcement. However, the OCE is often powerless to enforce com-
pliance because the subject of the complaint falls outside the scope
of their express authority. 03 Thus, where enforcement of require-
ments vital to a tenant's occupancy depend on the ability and effec-
tiveness of other agencies' enforcement measures the stabilization
system can not assure its tenants the receipt of all required services.
V. Conclusion
Rent regulation is not regarded as a permanent safeguard of
tenants' rights, but as an emergency measure to ensure decent
housing at reasonable prices until market conditions stabilize. As
the court of appeals stated in regard to rent control: "Rent controls,
all will agree, ought not achieve a status of permanence in our
economy. They have no justification except in periods of emergency
201. N.Y. Crry ADM. CODE §D26-1.01 to -57.11.
202. See N.Y. Crry CHARTER §1705, ch. 60.
203. Letter from Frank A. Dell'Aira, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Code Enforce-
ment, N.Y. City, Dec. 1, 1978. The assistant commissioner indicated that
[iln some instances, the stabilization system deals with services that are not required
by these laws (i.e.: ... doorman and elevator man services) which are not enforceable
by this agency [the OCE]. Since the services provided by this agency are not paid
for by rent stabilization but by the City, State & Federal Community Development
Funds, we cannot alter our scope of work to accommodate rent stabilization's extra
curricular activities.
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. . . Whether and for how long the Legislature may lawfully con-
tinue office rent control must, and shall, be a question open for
future review."1
It is apparent that some form of regulation is needed to guide New
York City's tenants through the current inflationary spiral. The
same conditions prevail now which led to the RSL's enactment ten
years ago, namely: exorbitant rents, uncontrolled inflation, and a
serious shortage of housing. Thus, it is doubtful that the RSL and
the ETPA will be permitted to expire or be phased out in the near
future.
Nevertheless, the present stabilization system has serious flaws.
The draftsmanship of the code and its implementation by the stabi-
lization agencies has left much to be desired. The longer the base
date provisions for rents and services continue, unamended, the
more inequitable the rents are destined to become and the less
adequate the services. The system's enforcement agencies must be
aided in their responsibilities by the passage of stricter and more
explicit guidelines binding the regulated parties to standards of
compliance and discipline. The plight of older buildings which now
constitute a majority of the stabilization stock must be better ac-
commodated by full analyses of their operating expenses when
guidelines are computed, or alternatively, by the issuance of more
discriminating guidelines: perhaps one set for pre-war housing and
another for post-war housing.
Self-policing, in and of itself, need not be the downfall of the
stabilization system.
The ultimate success, or even the utility, of the statutory mechanism
which brings an industry association into an active role of regulative respon-
sibility may be arguable one way or another. But fair latitude should be
allowed by the Court to the legislative body to generate new and imaginative
mechanisms addressed to municipal problems.10
The RSL's administrators must aggressively seek out violators
and impose harsher penalties to assure their compliance. Penalties
should be stated with specificity in the code to adequately forewarn
owners. The rent stabilization code should be amended to simplify
204. Lincoln Bldg. Assoc. v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 420, 135 N.E.2d 801, 806, 153 N.Y.S.2d
633, 639 (1956), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 12 (1957).
205. 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 132, 261 N.E.2d 647, 651, 313 N.Y.S.2d
733, 738 (1969).
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provisions which have become overly technical and complicated. A
system should be devised by which all stabilized parties are given
notice of their specific rights and obligations under the stabilization
law. Failure to remedy stabilization's key problems now could lead
to the crumbling of an otherwise solid regulatory wall erected by the
RSL to protect New York City tenants and owners.
Diane Ungar

